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in Relaying Networks with Untrusted Relay in the
Partial Secrecy Regime
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Abstract—Recently, three useful secrecy metrics based on
the partial secrecy regime were proposed to analyze secure
transmissions on wireless systems over quasi-static fading chan-
nels, namely: generalized secrecy outage probability, average
fractional equivocation, and average information leakage. These
metrics were devised from the concept of fractional equivo-
cation, which is related to the decoding error probability at
the eavesdropper, so as to provide a comprehensive insight on
the practical implementation of wireless systems with different
levels of secrecy requirements. Considering the partial secrecy
regime, in this paper we examine the secrecy performance of
an amplify-and-forward relaying network with an untrusted
relay node, where a destination-based jamming is employed
to enable secure transmissions. In this regard, a closed-form
approximation is derived for the generalized secrecy outage
probability, and integral-form expressions are obtained for the
average fractional equivocation and the average information
leakage rate. Additionally, equal and optimal power allocation
schemes are investigated and compared for the three metrics.
From this analysis, we show that different power allocation
approaches lead to different system design criteria. The obtained
expressions are validated via Monte Carlo simulations.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward, average fractional equiv-
ocation, average information leakage rate, generalized secrecy
outage probability, partial secrecy regime, power allocation,
untrusted relay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Novel applications and services are envisioned with the
implementation of the fifth generation (5G) of wireless net-
works, which are highly demanding in terms of reliability,
latency, energy efficiency, spectrum efficiency, flexibility, and
connection density. Thus, the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU) has categorized 5G services into three
broad groups: enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive
machine-type communication (mMTC), and ultra-reliable and
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low-latency communication (URLLC) [1], which will impulse
the progressive implementation of the Internet of Things (IoT)
paradigm. Considering these three service categories, it can be
foreseen that the upcoming applications for 5G and beyond are
extremely vulnerable to security breaches.
Traditionally, network security is provided by bit-level cryp-
tographic techniques and the corresponding protocols at the
different layers of the data processing stack. However, these
solutions present some weaknesses regarding public wireless
networks involving restrictions and high costs for the users.
Therefore, traditional approaches are not sufficient for guar-
anteeing confidentiality in 5G networks and beyond [2]. A new
paradigm for providing enhanced security in wireless networks
is referred to as physical layer security (PLS), which can
potentially offer secure transmissions by efficiently exploiting
the properties of wireless medium (fading, interference, and
diversity) [3].
In 1949, Shannon introduced the concepts on secrecy trans-
missions from the information theoretic perspective, when he
proposed the so-called cypher system in his pioneering work
in [4]. In that system, it is considered a noiseless channel
where a transmitter (Alice) intends to communicate with a
legitimate receiver (Bob), by sharing a secret key K that
Alice uses to encrypt a message M into a codeword X , in
order to maintain this in secret from an eavesdropper (Eve)
that intercept the message. Therein, it was defined the perfect
secrecy as the condition of X revealing no information about
M , i.e., the mutual information I(M ;X) = 0, so that M and
X must be statistically independent, thus the best that Eve can
do is to guess the transmitted message.
Later, in 1975, Wyner showed that secrecy can be attained
by exploiting the qualities of the channels without the need of
a shared key [5]. In that work, it was proposed the discrete
memoryless wiretap channel, where Alice must encode M
into a n-length codeword Xn, while Y n and Zn are the
outputs at Bob’s and Eve’s channels, respectively. Therein,
Wyner defined the concept of weak secrecy, which establishes
that the statistical independence between M and Zn is only
required asymptotically in the block length n, i.e., when
limn→∞(1/n)I(M ;Z
n)=0, thus describing the largest rate at
which Eve gains no information about M by observing Zn.
That definition was strengthen in [6] by disregarding the term
1/n in the definition of weak secrecy, thus defining the concept
of strong secrecy, and the intuition is that the information
leaked to Eve vanishes as n approaches ∞. Besides, in [5],
the so-called secrecy capacity was defined as the maximal
rate at which both reliability and security can be achieved,
thus characterizing a rate-equivocation region, where the rate
corresponds to the rate of reliable communication between
Alice and Bob, and the equivocation defines the uncertainty
about the message received by Eve. However, that definition
requires that the Bob’s channel must be less noisy than Eve’s
channel, thus only working for discrete memoryless channels.
Later, in [7], Wyner’s results were generalized for the non-
degraded case. Moreover, in [8], the secrecy capacity for
the Gaussian wiretap channel was studied, wherein it was
established that the secrecy capacity is the difference between
the capacities of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels;
therefore, a secure communication is possible if and only if
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate channel is
larger than that of the eavesdropper channel.
Furthermore, in [9] fading wiretap channels were investi-
gated in terms of ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) and secrecy
outage probability (SOP), where it was demonstrated that fad-
ing can actually be beneficial for transmitting information in
a secure manner. Besides, the multiple-input-multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channel was investigated in [10]. Then, by
virtue of the great advantages that multiple antennas can offer
in achieving enhanced secrecy performances, an extensive
number of works have investigated the secrecy performance of
MIMO networks [11]. On the other hand, cooperative relaying,
widely recognized for offering significant gains on reliability
and coverage in wireless networks, has also been considered as
a promising technique to exploit the physical characteristics of
wireless channels in order to improve the security of a network
against eavesdropping [12]. For instance, in [12], widely-
known relaying protocols, namely amplify-and-forward (AF)
and decode-and-forward (DF), were evaluated for cooperative
networks with multiple relays by considering the secrecy rate
maximization problem and power allocation subject to a power
constraint, and the transmit power minimization problem sub-
ject to a secrecy rate. Additionally, in that work, it was also
proposed the so-called cooperative jamming (CJ) technique,
in which the relays contribute to provide secrecy by sending
a jamming signal in order to interfere the eavesdroppers,
thus preventing them from extracting information from the
confidential message.
However, the reported benefits in the aforementioned works
are based on the premise that the relay is a trustworthy node.
Yet, in many networks, not all nodes have the same level
of security clearance, such that the information must be kept
confidential even from the relays. Those scenarios have raised
the interest on determining whether cooperation is beneficial
or not in the case of untrusted relays [13–25]. For instance,
in [13], the achievable secrecy rate for the compress-and-
forward protocol was studied for two cases: (i) when the first-
hop relaying link channel is orthogonal to the multiple access
channel from the source and relay to the destination, and (ii)
when the second-hop relaying link channel is orthogonal to the
broadcast channel from the source to the relay and destination.
For the first case, it was found that the secrecy capacity
is attained by restricting the confidential transmission to the
direct link, then the untrusted relay is not useful. However,
for the second case, it was found that the secrecy rate can be
improved by relying on the untrusted relay to cooperate with
information transmission rather than only considering it as an
eavesdropper. Besides, in [14, 15], a MIMO cooperative relay
network was addressed, where transmit beamforming was em-
ployed both at the source and at the untrusted relay. In [14], the
noncooperative secure beamforming and cooperative secure
beamforming were considered, and the conditions under which
the cooperative scheme achieves a higher secrecy rate than the
noncooperative scheme were characterized at the high SNR
regime. In [15], the jointly optimization of beamformers at
the source and relay was performed in order to maximize
the secrecy sum rate of a two-way communication; then, it
was shown the advantages of the signal alignment against
eavesdropping. Further, in [16], a positive secrecy rate was
obtained by relying on the destination node or an external node
to send a jamming signal in a two-hop compress-and forward
relaying network. This technique is referred to as destination-
based jamming (DBJ). In [17], the ESC was investigated
for the DBJ scheme, by considering the single-relay and
multiple-relay scenarios. For the latter, a secure relay selection
was proposed and the results showed that, from a secrecy
perspective, the system performance worsens as the number
of relays increases. Also, DBJ was explored in [18–20] along
with optimal power allocation based on instantaneous channel
estimations, where the impact of large scale antenna arrays at
either the source or the destination was examined for the ESC
in [18] and for the SOP in [19], while hardware impairments
were also considered in [20].
In [21], the impact of the direct link on the secrecy outage
probability was analyzed for a relaying network with multiple
untrusted AF relays, where partial relay selection and DBJ are
considered by means of a full-duplex destination. Moreover,
the ergodic secrecy sum rate was evaluated in [23] by consid-
ering a two-way communication with a friendly jammer and
an energy-constrained untrusted relay. In that work, wireless
energy transfer technique was employed to charge the relay,
and the impact of the time expended to charge the relay
was evaluated. In [24], the authors focused on the analysis
of the security-reliability trade-off based on the connection
outage probability and the intercept probability under hard-
ware impairments, for the case of direct transmission without
using the relay, and the case of destination-based cooperative
jamming. Moreover, in [25], a technique called constellation
overlapping was proposed to provide security to two-way
untrusted relaying systems in a resource-efficient manner. For
the symmetric case, where two terminal users adopt the same
modulation type, a full constellation overlapping was obtained,
and an error floor is caused at the untrusted relay. For the
asymmetric case, a constellation virtualization method was
employed in order to achieve the constellation overlapping
effect.
Nevertheless, all the aforementioned works above are
mainly based on the classical information-theoretic definition
of secrecy for quasi-static fading channels, whereby the per-
formance metrics are established from the premise that the
eavesdropper’s decoding error probability is equal to 1. Hence,
the classical SOP shows to be limited for an appropriate
design of practical secure wireless communication systems,
since it establishes an extremely stringent assumption, thus
presenting three important shortcomings. First, the SOP does
not allow to obtain appropriate insights on the eavesdropper’s
ability to decode confidential messages. Second, this metric
cannot characterize the amount of information that is leaked
to the eavesdropper when an outage occurs. Third, it cannot
be associated with the quality of service (QoS) demands of
different applications and services. In this regard, recently
in [26], new secrecy metrics for wireless transmissions focus-
ing on quasi-static fading channels were proposed, namely:
generalized secrecy outage probability (GSOP), average frac-
tional equivocation (AFE), and average information leakage
rate (AILR). These metrics are based on the so-called partial
secrecy regime, whereby a system is evaluated by means of
the fractional equivocation, which regards to the level at which
the eavesdropper is confused.
In light of the above considerations, this paper contributes
to further extend the understanding of the secrecy performance
of cooperative communications with untrusted relays. To this
end, we examine a three-node AF relaying network where
the relay is untrusted and a DBJ protocol is used to enable
secure transmissions. Differently from previous related works,
we analyze the secrecy performance in terms of the metrics
proposed in [26], for which we also consider different power
allocation policies among the source, relay, and destination.
The following are the main contributions of this paper:
• A closed-form approximate expression is derived for
the GSOP, which allows to associate the concept of
secrecy outage with the ability of the untrusted relay
to decode confidential information. Moreover, analytical
expressions in a one-fold integral form are obtained for
the AFE and AILR. The former is an asymptotic lower
bound on the untrusted relay’s decoding error probability,
and the latter describes how much and how fast the
information is leaked to the untrusted relay.
• For the aforementioned metrics, simple closed-form
asymptotic expressions are obtained joint with the system
diversity order.
• For the three aforementioned performance metrics, equal
power allocation (EPA) and optimal power allocation
(OPA) schemes are compared.
Throughout this paper, fZ (·) and FZ (·) denote the proba-
bility density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of a random variable Z , respectively, E {·}
denotes expectation, Pr (·) denotes probability, and W [x] is
the principal value of the Lambert-W function [27].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model depicted in Fig. 1 illustrates a cooperative
relaying network consisting of a single-antenna source S that
tries to communicate with a single-antenna destination D with
the help of a single-antenna AF relay R. The relay node
is considered to have a lower level of security clearance to
access the confidential information transmitted by S, then it
is an untrusted node that can potentially attempt to decode
the message from the signal sending by S. In this system, the
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Fig. 1. System Model of a three-node relaying network with an untrusted
relay and DBJ.
direct link is considered to be extremely attenuated, so that it is
negligible, and the widely-used wiretap codes are assumed for
message transmissions [5]. Thus, the codebook is assumed to
be defined by two rate parameters, the codeword transmission
rate RT=
H(Xn)
n and the confidential information rate or target
secrecy rate RS=
H(M)
n , where RS ≤ RT . Hence, the wiretap
code is constructed by generating 2nRT codewords xn (u, v),
where u={1, 2, ..., 2nRS} and v={1, 2, ..., 2n(RT−RS)}. Then,
for each message of index u, it is randomly selected an index v
with uniform distribution, such that the codeword xn (u, v) is
transmitted. The communication process is performed in two
phases, as described below:
• First phase: in this phase, S sends an information signal
sI(t) to R; meanwhile, D sends an artificial jamming
signal sJ (t) to hinder the relay from eavesdropping the
information sent by S.
• Second phase: in this phase, the relay amplifies the signal
received from S, which was interfered by the jamming
signal sent by D, and forwards it to the destination. Since
D knows the jamming signal transmitted in the previous
phase, this can be subtracted f rom the received signal.
All links in this network are considered to undergo quasi-
static Rayleigh fading, as well as additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with mean power N0. Therefore, the channel
coefficients for the links S→R, R→D and D→R, denoted by
hSR, hRD, and hDR, respectively, are independent complex
circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variables with variance
ΩAB=E{|hAB|2}, that is CN (0,ΩAB), with A∈{S,R,D}
and B∈{R,D}. Accordingly, the channel gains gAB = |hAB|2
are exponentially distributed with mean value ΩAB. Thus,
the instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at
the first-hop relaying link, second-hop relaying link, and
jamming link are, respectively, given by γSR=gSRPS/N0,
γRD=gRDPR/N0, and γDR=gDRPD/N0, where PS, PR, and
PD are the transmit powers at source, relay and destination.
In addition, the total transmit system power is assumed to be
limited to a value of P , for the whole transmission process.
Accordingly, by denoting the total transmit system SNR as
γP = P/N0, the transmit SNRs at S, D, and R can be respec-
tively written as γS=PS/N0= η1γP , γR=PR/N0= η2γP ,
and γD=PD/N0= η3γP , where η1, η2, and η3 are the power
allocation factors, with η1 + η2 + η3 = 1.
Under the above assumptions, the received signal at R
during the first phase is given by
yR (t) =
√
PShSRsI (t)+
√
PDhDRsJ (t)+nR(t) , (1)
where the mean power of the signals sI(t) and sJ(t) are
normalized to unity, that is E{|sI (t) |2} = E{|sJ (t) |2} = 1,
and nR(t) is the AWGN component at R.
On the other hand, the received signal at D during the
second phase is given by
yD (t) =
√
PRhRDGyR (t) + nD(t) , (2)
where nD(t) is the AWGN component at D, and G is the
amplification factor related to the AF protocol, given as
G = 1√
PSgSR + PDgDR +N0
. (3)
Hence, by substituting (1) into (2) and considering that the
jamming signal can be effectively removed at D, the received
signal at D during the second phase can be rewritten as
yD (t)=
√
PRhRDG
√
PShSRsI (t)+
√
PRhRDGnR(t)+nD(t) .
(4)
Thus, after some mathematical manipulation, the instantaneous
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) received at R
and D, during the first and second phase, can respectively be
expressed as
ΓR =
PSgSR
PDgRD +N0
=
γSR
γRD + 1
, (5)
ΓD =
PSgSRPRgRD
PSgSRN0 + PRgRDN0 + PDgRDN0 +N20
=
γSRγRD
γSR + γRD + γDR + 1
, (6)
where we have assumed reciprocity between the R→D and
D→R links, so that in the following we consider γRD = γDR.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The partial secrecy can be quantified by the fractional
equivocation, which is an asymptotic lower bound of the
decoding error probability at the eavesdropper; therefore, it
is related to the capability of the eavesdropper on decoding
the confidential message, being defined as [8]
∆ =
H (M |Zn)
H (M)
(7)
where M is the confidential information, Zn is the received
information at the eavesdropper, and H (M) and H (M |Zn)
are the entropy of the source’s information and the residual
uncertainty for the message at the eavesdropper, respectively.
From this, the fractional equivocation for a given fading
realization of the wireless channel is given by [26]
∆ =


1, if CE ≤ CL −RS
(CL − CE) /RS, if CL −RS < CE < CL
0, if CL ≤ CE ,
(8)
where, for the proposed system, CL =
1
2 log2 (1 + ΓD) is the
capacity of the legitimate channel; CE =
1
2 log2 (1 + ΓR) is
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel (at the S→R link);
and RS is the secrecy rate. Thus, by defining the random
variable Φ
∆
= 1+ΓD1+ΓR , the fractional equivocation in (8) can be
rewritten as
∆ =


1, if Φ ≥ 22RS
1
2RS
log2Φ, if Φ < 2
2RS < Φ22RS
0, if Φ ≤ 1.
(9)
A characterization of ∆ measures the long-term perfor-
mance of a system with time-varying channel realizations,
from which the GSOP, AFE, and AILR can be investigated [8].
In the following, these three secrecy metrics are analyzed for
the proposed system.
A. Generalized Secrecy Outage Probability – GSOP
The GSOP characterizes the probability that the fractional
equivocation is lower than a certain value θ or, in other words,
the information leakage ratio, 1 −∆, is larger than a certain
value, 1− θ, and it can be expressed as [26]
GSOP = Pr (∆ < θ) , (10)
where 0 < θ ≤ 1 denotes the minimum acceptable value of the
fractional equivocation, and it is related to the ability of R on
extracting information from the confidential message sent by
S. An approximate expression for the GSOP of the proposed
system, which is highly accurate for the medium-to-high SNR
regime, can be obtained as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. By defining τ1
∆
= 22RSθ, an approximation for
the generalized secrecy outage probability of a three-node AF
relaying network with an untrusted relay is given by
GSOP ≈√piη1τ1ΩSRψ3eψ6erfc
[
ψ3(η1τ1ΩSR +ΩRD
√
ψ2)
]
−e−ψ5+ (e−ψ5−e−ψ4) e− η1ΩSRψ5ΩRD(η2+η3) − eψ7 + e−ψ8+1,
(11)
where,
ψ1 =
√
(η2+η3)2(η22(τ1−1)2+2η2η3(2τ21−τ1−1)+η23(1−2τ1)2)
γ2P η
2
1η
2
2η
2
3
,
ψ2 =η
2
2
(
2τ21 − 2τ1 + 1
)
+ η23
(
5τ21 − 4τ1 + 1
)
+ 2η2η3
(
3τ21 − τ1 + γP η1τ1ψ1 − 1
)
,
ψ3 =
1
2ΩRD
√
γP η1η2η3τ1ΩSR
,
ψ4 =
(τ1 − 1)(η2 + η3)
γP η1η2ΩSR
,
ψ5 =
(η2+η3)
√
−2τ1 (η22+η2η3+2η23)+τ21 (η2+2η3)2+(η2−η3)2
2γP η1η2η3ΩSR
+
(η2 + η3) (η2(τ1 − 1) + η3(2τ1 − 1))
2γP η1η2η3ΩSR
,
ψ6 =
2η2ΩRD(η1τ1ΩSR + η3(τ − 1)ΩRD) + η22Ω2RD
4γP η1η2η3τ1Ω2RDΩSR
+
(η1τ1ΩSR + η3(1− τ1)ΩRD)2
4γP η1η2η3τ1Ω2RDΩSR
,
ψ7 =
η1ΩSR(η2 − η3τ1 + η3)− η1(γP η2η3ΩRDψ1 +ΩSR
√
ψ2)
2γP η1η2η3ΩRDΩSR
+
ΩRD(−η2 − η3)(η2(τ1 − 1) + η3(2τ1 − 1))
2γP η1η2η3ΩRDΩSR
,
ψ8 =
η22(τ1 − 1) + η23(2τ1 − 1) + η2η3(3τ1 + γP η1ψ1 − 2)
2γP η1η2η3ΩSR
.
Proof. The proof is provided in appendix A. 
B. Average Fractional Equivocation – AFE
By taking the average of the fractional equivocation in (9)
we can derive the (longterm) average for the factional equivo-
cation. Therefore, as the eavesdropper’s decoding error prob-
ability for a given fading realization is asymptotically lower
bounded by the fractional equivocation, the average factional
equivocation, ∆¯ , actually provides an asymptotic lower bound
on the overall decoding error probability at Eve, thus being an
error-probability-based secrecy metric, given as in [26]
∆¯ =E{∆}. (12)
For the proposed system, an approximation for the average
fractional equivocation at high SNR is obtained as in Propo-
sition 2.
Proposition 2. An approximate expression for the average
fractional equivocation of a three-node AF relaying network
with an untrusted relay is given by
∆¯ ≈1−
(
1− ln(2
2RS )
ln(2)2RS
)
FΦ
(
22RS
)
− 1
ln(2)2RS
[
ln(1)FΦ (1) +
∫ 22RS
1
1
φ
FΦ (φ) dφ
]
,
(13)
where FΦ (·) is the CDF of the random variable Φ defined as
in (9), given by (28) in Appendix A. (11), which was obtained
as described in Appendix A.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
C. Average Information Leakage Rate – AILR
For the cases where classical information-theoretic secrecy
is not achievable, some information will be leaked to the eaves-
dropper. Therefore, different secure transmission schemes that
lead to the same secrecy outage probability may actually result
in very different amounts of information leakage. Then, this
metric provides a notion of how fast the information is leaked
to the untrusted relay. Thus, for a fixed-rate transmission, it
can be defined as in [26]
RL =
(
1− ∆¯)RS . (14)
For the proposed system, an approximation for the average
information leakage rate at high SNR is obtained by following
Proposition 2 and (14), as follows.
Corollary 1. An approximate expression for the average
information leakage rate of a three-node AF relaying network
with an untrusted relay is given by
RL ≈RS
(
1− ln(2
2RS )
ln(2)22RS
)
FΦ
(
22RS
)
+
RS
ln(2)22RS
[
ln(1)FΦ (1) +
∫ 22RS
1
1
φ
FΦ (φ) dφ
]
,
(15)
where FΦ (·) is given by (28) in Appendix A.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, simpler analytical expressions for the three
metrics analyzed above are obtained by considering the system
performance at high SNR, which are useful to grasp a better
insight into the attained diversity order and the impact of key
parameters on the secrecy performance of the investigated
system. These asymptotic expressions for GSOP, AFE, and
AILR are introduced in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Asymptotic expressions for the GSOP (11),
AFE (13), and AILR (15) of a three-node AF relaying network
with an untrusted relay are given by
GSOP∞ =
√
piη1τ1ΩSR
4γP η2η3Ω2RD
+
2(1−η1)η3(τ1−1)ΩRD+η1ΩSR(η1+η3τ1−1)
2γP η1η2η3ΩRDΩSR
∝
(
1
γP
)1
2
, (16)
∆¯∞=
1
2γP η1η2η3ΩRDΩSR log(22RS )
×
[
−2√pi√γP η3/21
√
η2
√
η3
(√
22RS − 1
)
Ω
3/2
SR +ln(2
2RS )
×[2η3ΩRD(γP η1η2ΩSR−η1+1)−(η1−1)η1ΩSR]
+η3(2
2RS − 1)(2(η1 − 1)ΩRD − η1ΩSR)
]
,
(17)
R∞L =
(
1− ∆¯∞)RS . (18)
Proof. The asymptotic expressions are derived by consider-
ing the high SNR regime, i.e., with γP → ∞. Then, by
neglecting the higher order terms of the Maclaurin series
expansion for the exponential function in [28, Eq. (0.318.2)],
we have that e−x ≃ 1 − x. After replacing this into the
CDFs of expressions (30), (31), (36), and (37) in appendix A,
solving the integrals, and performing some simplifications, the
expression in (16) can be obtained. can be obtained. Finally,
by replacing (16) into (13), it yields the expression in (17). 
Remark 1. From (16), it can be infer that the system diversity
order equals ∼ 12 .
V. THROUGHPUT-CONSTRAINED SECRECY
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the previous secrecy performance metrics
are optimized by taking into account a minimum throughput
of confidential transmission constraint, Γ. We define the
throughput of confidential transmission, T , as the probability
of successful transmission times the secrecy rate. Then, an
approximate anlytical expression for the throughput of the
confidential transmission can be obtained as stated in Propo-
sition 4
Proposition 4. An approximation for the throughput of con-
fidential transmission for a three-node AF relaying network
with an untrusted relay is given by
T ≈ RS exp
[
−
(
22RT − 1) (η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3))
γP η1η2ΩRDΩSR
]
,
(19)
where RT is the codeword transmission rate.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
Proposition 5. The maximum achievable throughput con-
strained to RT ≥ RS > 0, for a given power allocation factor
at D, η3, is given by
Tmax=RTS exp


(
1−22RTS
)
(ΩRD(η
T
2 +η3)+ΩSR(1−ηT2 −η3))
γP ηT2 ΩRDΩSR(1−ηT2 −η3)

 ,
(20)
where
RTS =
1
ln 4
W
(
−
γP η
T
2 ΩRDΩSR(1− η
T
2 − η3)
(ηT2 + η3)(ΩRD − ΩSR) + ΩSR
)
, (21)
ηT2 =


1
2 −
1
2η3, if ΩSR=ΩRD
−
√
ΩRD(η3(ΩRD−ΩSR)+ΩSR)
(ΩRD−ΩSR)
2 −η3−
ΩSR
ΩRD−ΩSR
if ΩSR>ΩRD√
ΩRD(η3(ΩRD−ΩSR)+ΩSR)
(ΩRD−ΩSR)
2 −η3−
ΩSR
ΩRD−ΩSR
if ΩSR<ΩRD.
(22)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix D. 
From Proposition 5, it can be noticed that the feasible range
for the throughput of confidential information is 0<Γ<Tmax.
In light of this, the system parameters can be optimized
regarding the proposed secrecy metrics given a minimum
required throughput of confidential information, Γ, which is
directly related to the system reliability. That is, by considering
the following optimization problems, we can determine the
optimal system parameters required to attain the best secrecy
and reliable performance for a certain throughput.
A. Minimization of the Generalized Secrecy Outage Probabil-
ity
For this optimization problem, we would like to find the
rate parameters and the power allocation factors that minimize
the generalized secrecy outage probability given in (11).
Therefore, the optimization problem can be formulated as
• OPA1:
min
RS ,RT ,η1,η2,η3
GSOP(τ1)
s.t. T > Γ, RT ≥ RS > 0, η1 > 0, η2 > 0, η3 > 0,
η1 + η2 + η3 = 1. (23)
B. Maximization of the Average Fractional Equivocation
Following the same reasoning, we can find the rate pa-
rameters and the power allocation factors that maximizes the
average fractional equivocation, ∆¯, given in (13). Therefore,
the optimization problem can be formulated as
• OPA2:
max
RS,RT ,η1,η2,η3
∆¯
s.t. T > Γ, RT ≥ RS > 0, η1 > 0, η2 > 0, η3 > 0,
η1 + η2 + η3 = 1. (24)
C. Minimization of the Average Information Leakage Rate
Finally, we can find the rate parameters and the power
allocation factor that minimizes the average fractional equivo-
cation RL, given in (14). Therefore, the optimization problem
can be formulated as
• OPA3:
min
RS,RT ,η1,η2,η3
RL
s.t. T > Γ, RT ≥ RS > 0, η1 > 0, η2 > 0, η3 > 0,
η1 + η2 + η3 = 1. (25)
Due to the complexity of the expressions in (11) and (13),
the optimal values for R1S , R
1
T , η
1
1 , η
1
2 , and η
1
3 , corresponding
to the problem OPA1 in (23); R2T , η
2
1 , η
2
2 , and η
2
3 , correspond-
ing to the problem OPA2 in (24); and R3S , R
3
T , η
3
1 , η
3
2 , and
η33 , corresponding to the problem OPA3 in (25), cannot be
obtained in closed form. However, a numerical optimization
can be performed through optimization tools provided by
specialized software such as Wolfram Mathematica or Matlab
(e.g. the function FindMinimum of Wolfram Mathemat-
ica). Alternatively, by considering the asymptotic expressions
in (16) and (17), very close results to those obtained by
numerical optimization via software tools can be attained
by resorting to iterative algorithms to solve optimization
problems of continuous nonlinear functions. For instance, in
Algorithm 1 we apply the Particle Swarm Optmization (PSO)
method (cf. [29] for more details), which is a population-
based stochastic optimization algorithm, to solve the formu-
lated optimization problems. This algorithm offers a simpler
implementation that can be applied in practical systems.
Algorithm 1 PSO algorithm
1: function OF(var, γP , α, θ,ΩSR,ΩRD,Γ) {var is an array}
2: of← Eq. (16) {Cost function of GSOP, (-)AFE, or AILR}
3: penalty← 1
4: const1← Eq. (19)
5: const2← var(1) + var(2) + var(3)
6: if const1 > Γ then
7: penalty← penvalue
8: end if
9: if const2! = 1 then
10: penalty← penalty ∗ penvalue
11: end if
12: if var(5) < var(4) then
13: penalty← penalty ∗ penvalue
14: end if
15: of← of+ penalty
16: return of
17: end fucntion
18: function Pso(γP , α, θ,ΩSR,ΩRD,Γ)
19: iter← #iterations
20: p← #particles {Set population size}
21: c1← c_init {Weighting coeff. for personal best pos.}
22: c2← c_init {Weighting coeff. for global best pos.}
23: w← wvalue {Set inertia weight}
24: n← #variables
25: varmin ← [eta1mineta2mineta3minRsminRtmin]{Set min values}
26: varmax← [eta1maxeta2maxeta3maxRsmaxRtmax] {Set max values}
27: v← initialv {Set initial velocity}
28: fgbest← 10
29: for i← 1 to p do
30: for j← 1 to n do
31: var(i, j)← (varmax(j)− varmin(j)) ∗ rand() + varmin(j) {Initial
position}
32: aux(j)← aux(i, j)
33: end for
34: fitness(i)← OF(aux, γP , α, θ,ΩSR,ΩRD,Γ)
35: if fitness(i) < fgbest then
36: fgbest← fitness(i)
37: for j← 1ton do
38: vargbest(j)← var(i, j)
39: end for
40: end if
41: end for
42: varpbest← var
43: fpbest← fitness
44: for i← 1toiter do
45: v ← w ∗ v + c1 ∗ rand(p, n) ∗ (varpbest − var) + c2 ∗ rand(p, n) ∗
(vargbest− var)) {Update velocity (element-wise operation)}
46: var← var+ v {Update position}
47: for j← 1top do
48: for k← 1ton do
49: if var(j, k) < varmin(k) then
50: var(j, k)← varmin(k)
51: end if
52: if var(j, k) > varmax(k) then
53: var(j, k)← varmax(k)
54: end if
55: aux(k)← aux(j, k)
56: end for
57: fitness(j)← OF(aux, γP , α, θ,ΩSR,ΩRD,Γ)
58: if fitness(j) < fpbest(j) then
59: fpbest(j)← fitness(j)
60: for k← 1ton do
61: varpbest(j, k)← var(j, k) {Up. personal best}
62: end for
63: end if
64: if fitness(j) < fgbest then
65: fgbest← fitness(j)
66: for k← 1ton do
67: vargbest(k)← var(j, k) {Up. global best}
68: end for
69: end if
70: end for
71: w← w ∗ 0.7 {Decrease inertia weight}
72: end for
73: return fgbest, vargbest end fucntion
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Fig. 2. GSOP versus transmit system SNR for different values of θ,
considering RS = 1 bps/Hz, ΩSR = ΩRD, and EPA.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are carried out
to validate our analytical results for some illustrative cases.
For this purpose, it is considered a two-dimensional network
topology, where S and D are located at the coordinates (0, 0)
and (1, 0) (assuming normalized distances), respectively, while
the untrusted relay is located midway between S and D.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the average
channel gain for all links is determined by the distance
between the respective pair of nodes, i.e., ΩAB = d
−α
AB,
with A∈{S,R,D} and B∈{R,D}, where dAB is the distance
between the corresponding nodes, and α is the path loss
exponent (for the evaluated cases, we consider α = 4). More-
over, for optimizations we have considered Algorithm 1 for a
population size of #particles = 2000, #iterations = 100,
c_init = 0.3, and wvalue = 0.3.
Fig. 2 illustrates the GSOP versus the transmit system
SNR for different values of θ, considering RS=1 bps/Hz,
d = dSR/dSD = 0.5 (such that ΩSR=ΩRD), and equal power
allocation (EPA) among nodes. It can be observed that our
approximation is very tight from medium-to-high SNR. Also,
notice that, for achieving the same performance in terms of
GSOP, a gain of ∼6 dB in SNR is obtained when comparing
the case in which the capability of the relay to decode the
confidential message is very low (e.g. θ = 0.1) and that of the
classical approach (i.e., θ = 1). That is, in scenarios where it
is possible a relaxation on the secrecy requirement due to a
lower capability of R on decoding the confidential information,
important power savings can be obtained by considering the
GSOP as a design criterion.
Fig. 3 shows the GSOP versus the secrecy rate RS for
different values of θ, considering γP=30 dB and d=0.5 (such
that ΩSR=ΩRD). This figure also compares different power
allocation strategies, namely, EPA, the proposed OPA schemes
obtained from the optimization problems in Section V, and the
OPA presented in [19, Eq. (8)]. First, notice that, even though
the OPA scheme of [19] renders an improved performance re-
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Fig. 3. GSOP versus secrecy rate RS for different values of θ, considering
γP = 30 dB and ΩSR = ΩRD. A comparison with the OPA scheme in [19]
and the EPA scheme is also shown.
garding our proposed schemes, it noteworthy that the strategy
in [19] is based on instantaneous channel state information
(CSI), while our schemes are based on statistical CSI, which
makes it more appealing for practical systems, as statistical
CSI-based schemes are more robust to imperfect or outdated
channel estimation. It can be also observed that, even though
an increase on RS results in a worse secrecy performance
for all levels of decodability requirement at R, an increase
in RS results in a more significant loss in secrecy outage
performance for the classical approach (θ=1), thus the secrecy
outage probability rapidly achieves 1. However, by relaxing
the decodability requirement at R (e.g., for θ=0.5 and 0.1),
the loss in performance becomes much less pronounced, then
higher secrecy rates can be set while attaining the same level
of secrecy outage probability. Regarding the power allocation
strategies, it is observed that an optimal power allocation
scheme greatly improves the secrecy performance leading to
ensure secrecy even for higher secrecy rates, and this improve-
ment is more significant as the value of θ decreases. Addition-
ally, it is observed that as RS increases, the performance with
OPA deteriorates and converges to that with EPA, specially
for θ = 1, thus, for certain RS , employing an OPA scheme is
not advantageous than using equal power allocation factors for
all nodes. Also, by comparing the three aforementioned OPA
strategies, it is observed that, for this particular case, the three
strategies achieve the same performances, except for the case
θ = 0.1. That is, for scenarios where the decodability at R is
low, OPA2 and OPA3 renders the secrecy performance worse
than OPA1. All in all, a considerable loss in performance will
be attained if the system were designed with a power allocation
that optimize the classical secrecy outage for scenarios that
requires a low decodability at R.
A similar analysis is shown in Fig. 4, where the secrecy
performance is measured by the average fractional equivo-
cation (characterized as an asymptotic lower bound of the
eavesdropper’s decoding error probability) and the average
information leakage rate versus the secrecy rate RS , for
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Fig. 4. Average fractional equivocation, ∆¯, and average information leakage
rate, RL, versus secrecy rate RS , for γP = 30 dB.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
PSfrag replacements
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
S
ec
re
cy
O
u
ta
g
e
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y,
G
S
O
P
Normalized distance, d
θ = 1, 0.8, 0.5, 0.2
Simulation
EPA
OPA1
OPA2
OPA3
θ=1, 0.5, 0.1
θ=0.1, 0.5, 1
θ=0.1
Fig. 5. GSOP versus normalized distance d, for different values of θ, RS = 1
bps/Hz, and γP = 30 dB.
γP=30 dB, RS=1 bps/Hz, and d (i.e., ΩSR=ΩRD). It is
observed that higher values of average fractional equivocation
can be attained for the proposed system as RS decreases; on
the contrary, the average information leakage rate increases
sharply as RS increases. The same remarks of Fig. 3 are
corroborated regarding the power allocation schemes, that
is, OPA1 for θ=1, OPA2, and OPA3 all attain the same
performance, although the improvement with respect to EPA
is not much significant. However, when considering OPA1 for
θ=0.1, the performance is compromised.
In Figs. 5 and 6, the three considered performance metrics
are illustrated versus the normalized distance between R and
S, d, for γP=30 dB and RS=1 bps/Hz. For those figures, EPA
is compared with the proposed OPA strategies. From Fig. 5,
we can notice that there is an optimal relay position for which
the secrecy outage probability results in a minimum, which is
closer to D as the decoding capability of R decreases. In fact,
in the vicinity of D (i.e., for ΩSR<ΩRD), it can be observed a
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Fig. 6. Average fractional equivocation, ∆¯, and average information leakage
rate, RL, versus normalized distance d for RS=1 bps/Hz and γP = 30 dB.
significant loss in performance when considering the classical
secrecy outage, while in the vicinity of S (i.e., for ΩSR>ΩRD),
the level of decoding capability at R does not significantly
impact the secrecy performance, since, at those positions, R is
in advantageous channel conditions for eavesdropping (strong
wiretap channel and weak jamming channel). Regarding the
power allocation strategies, it can be noticed that OPA1, OPA2,
and OPA3 all show the same performance except for the case
θ = 0.1, as previously observed. Even though the difference
between OPA1 and the others strategies is minimal for θ =
0.1, OPA2 and OPA3 show a performance worse than EPA
at the relay positions around the minimum value of GSOP
with EPA. Also, it is observed that a significant improvement
is achieved by considering OPA instead of EPA, specially for
the positions of R closer to S. At the position of the best EPA
performance, it can be observed no difference between OPA
and EPA, while OPA boosts the secrecy performance at the
vicinity of D much more than EPA, thus the best performance
is achieved in positions of R very close to D for all values
of θ. From Fig. 6, we can notice that a remarkable difference
between EPA and OPA is observed for positions of R closer
to S (i.e., for ΩSR>ΩRD), where the channel conditions are
advantageous for eavesdropping, while for the positions of R
closer to D (i.e., for ΩSR<ΩRD), the secrecy performance,
according to these two metrics, is highly favorable using either
OPA or EPA. In other words, the secrecy performance in terms
of δ¯ andRL always improves as R approaches D. Moreover, by
considering OPA, independently of the metric being optimized
(OPA1, OPA2, or OPA3), the secrecy performance is greatly
improved at any position of R. From the above figures, it can
be concluded that the secrecy performance from the GSOP
perspective or from the other two metrics perspective leads to
different insights regarding the optimal position of the relay
and the power allocation strategy.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the three considered metrics versus
the minimum required throughput of confidential informa-
tion, Γ, for γP=30 dB. Both figures compare the optimal
parameters obtained numerically by solving the optimization
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problems in (23), (24), and (25).
We can observe from Fig. 7 that, by considering GSOP, the
secrecy performance deteriorates in a higher rate for the classi-
cal approach as the constraint on the throughput of confidential
information increases. Also, performing OPA improves the
secrecy performance in a more significant manner when the re-
quirement on the decoding capability of R is low (e.g. θ=0.1).
Besides, as the throughput constraint increases, there is no
difference between EPA and OPA for the classical approach,
but for lower values of θ, a significant gain on performance by
considering OPA1 is observed. On the other hand, regarding
the other two metrics, we can observe from Fig. 8 that higher
values of ∆¯ can be achieved until the maximum achievable
value of T is attained (∼ 3.8), which is independent of the
adopted power allocation strategy. However, regarding the
average information leakage rate, there is a rapidly increasing
as Γ approaches the maximum achievable value for T , and
some differences can be evidenced between the considered
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2
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power allocation strategies, where a better performance of
OPA1 over OPA2, OPA3 is observed for θ = 0.1. Therefore,
it is evidenced that the allocation of parameters to improve
the secrecy performance is not the same regarding the metric
that is considered, that is the classical approach, GSOP, AFE,
or AILR.
Finally, Fig. 9 illustrates the throughput of confidential
transmission versus the secrecy rate, RS , by comparing EPA
and the optimal value for ηT2 from (22), for different scenarios
and γP = 30 dB. Notice that, for all cases, it is confirmed that,
for the corresponding values of RTS and η
T
2 , the maximum
throughput is attained. Moreover, it can be observed that
the best scenario in terms of secrecy throughput is the one
where ΩSR=ΩRD (relay in the midway), and it is allocated
less power for jamming. Indeed, for the three scenarios,
ΩSR>ΩRD, ΩSR=ΩRD, and ΩSR<ΩRD, the best throughput
is achieved when allocating less power to jamming, and EPA
performs better than the strategy that considers a higher power
for jamming while considering the optimal values for RS and
η2. The worst throughput is obtained when ΩSR<ΩRD, and a
higher power is intended for jamming.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper investigated the secrecy performance on the
partial secrecy regime for a three-node amplify-and-forward
relaying network with an untrusted relay, in which destination-
based jamming is used to enable secure communication. To
this end, analytical expressions for three recently proposed
secrecy metrics, which are based on the concept of fractional
equivocation, were obtained and verified via Monte Carlo
simulations. Specifically, a closed-form approximation for the
generalized secrecy outage probability was derived, while
integral-form approximate expressions were obtained for the
average fractional equivocation and the average information
leakage rate. Those expressions proved to be very tight to
the simulation results at medium-to-high SNR. Numerical
results showed that optimal power allocation schemes greatly
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improve the system secrecy performance, thus reinforcing
the advantages of cooperative communications even when
the relay is untrusted. However, according to the analyzed
metrics, different power allocation strategies and different
rate parameters result in different levels of secrecy system
performance. Therefore, the optimal power allocation and
secrecy rate depend on the secrecy requirements of the system
and the capability of the relay in decoding the confidential
information. Thus, a significant loss in performance can be
obtained when using optimal power allocation according to the
classical secrecy outage probability definition, by considering
a system with lower requirements on the decoding capability
at the relay or lower information leakage rate values. Indeed,
the classical approach is highly restrictive in terms of secrecy
rate and throughput. Then, for higher values of these two
parameters, there is no gain in performance by using optimal
power allocation or equal power allocation.
Finally, we point out as future directions the analysis
of the multi-relay scenario, where one out of N untrusted
relays is selected to cooperate with the legitimate transmission
between Alice and Bob. In the case of non-colluding relays,
this scenario is similar to that of multiple eavesdroppers,
where the eavesdropped information is given by the strongest
eavesdropping link. In that case, different scenarios can be
tackled. For instance, in [17] and [21], it is assumed that the
selected relay uses directional antennas in order to focus the
transmission beam toward the destination, during the second
transmission phase. Then, the signal received at the non-
selected relays from the selected one is weak enough that
can be neglected. This way, an information leakage occurs
only in the transmission phase from the source. On the other
hand, the work in [30] does not assume directional antennas,
thus the non-selected relays can overhear the transmission
from the selected relay and try to eavesdrop on it. Thus, the
non-selected relays might combine the signals coming from
Alice and the selected relay. To counteract this problem, the
authors in [30] proposed a source-based jamming during the
second transmission phase in order to enhance the secrecy
performance. In Figs. 10 and 11 are shown some simulations
for those protocols, where EPA is considered in all cases, and
maximal-ratio combining is considered for the protocol in [30].
For the multi-relay case, it is considered that the selected
relay is the one that maximizes the legitimate link. Note that
the jamming and power allocation strategies would play an
important role into the gains that can be obtained from the use
of multiple relays. Moreover, higher values of RS are more
restricted in the classical secrecy outage probability definition,
thus impacting on the amount of information leakage. For
instance, due to the jamming signals transmitted during the two
phases, it is observed that the average information leakage rate,
RL, becomes lower in [30]. Thus, investigating novel relay
selection strategies, protocols and optimal power allocations
for the multi-relay scenario would render important insights
on the performance of untrusted relay networks in the partial
secrecy regime, thereby being a strong motivation for future
works.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By replacing (9) in (10), the GSOP can be expressed as
GSOP =Pr (Φ ≤ 1) + Pr (Φ < 22RSθ | Φ < 22RS < Φ22RS)
× Pr (Φ < 22RS < Φ22RS)
(a)
=FΦ (1) + FΦ
(
22RSθ
)− FΦ (1)
=FΦ
(
22RSθ
)
, (26)
where (a) was obtained by noticing that 22RSθ ≤ 22RS . Thus,
an expression for the GSOP can be obtained by deriving
the CDF of the random variable Φ. However, the exact
solution for this problem is mathematically intricate, thus an
approximation for this CDF can be obtained by resorting to
approximate the harmonic mean by its well known upper
bound, ABA+B < min{A,B}, as in [31], which renders a tight
approximation from medium-to-high SNR. Then, (6) can be
approximated as
ΓD =
γR
γR + γD
γSgSR (γR + γD) gRD
γSgSR + (γR + γD) gRD + 1
<
γR
γR + γD
min{γSgSR, (γR + γD) gRD}. (27)
Therefore, a lower bound for the CDF of Φ can be formu-
lated as
FLBΦ (φ)=Pr

1 +
γR
γR + γD
min{γSgSR, (γR + γD) gRD}
1 +
γSgSR
γDgRD + 1
< φ


=Pr
(
γSγRgSR
γR+γD
<φ+
φγSgSR
γDgRD+1
−1
∣∣∣gRD> γSgSR
γR+γD
)
Pr
(
gRD>
γSgSR
γR+γD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+Pr
(
γRgRD<φ+
φγSgSR
γDgRD+1
−1
∣∣∣gRD< γSgSR
γR+γD
)
Pr
(
gRD<
γSgSR
γR+γD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
,
(28)
where the terms J1 and J2 can be reorganized and further
derived as showing next. First, by solving J1 in terms of
gSR and gRD, this can be splitted into two probability terms,
regarding the valid regions for gSR, and reexpressed as
J1 = Pr
(
gRD>
(φ−1) (γR+γD)+gSRγSφ (γR+γD)−gSRγRγS
gSRγSγRγD−(φ−1)γD (γR+γD) ,
gSR<
(φ−1) (γR+γD)
γSγR
, gRD>
γSgSR
γR+γD
)
+ Pr
(
gRD<
(φ−1) (γR+γD)+gSRγSφ (γR+γD)−gSRγRγS
gSRγSγRγD − (φ− 1) γD (γR + γD) ,
gRD≥ γSgSR
γR+γD
, gSR >
(φ−1)(γD+γR)
γRγS
, γ2SγRγDg
2
SR
+γS (γR+γD) ((1−2φ)γD+(1−φ)γR)gSR−(φ−1) (γR+γD)2<0
)
= Pr
(
gSR <
(γR + γD) (φ− 1)
γSγR
, gRD >
γSgSR
γR + γD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ Pr
(
(φ− 1)(γD + γR)
γRγS
< gSR <
(γD + γR)ϕ1
2γDγRγS
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2,1
γSgSR
γD+γR
≤gRD<γD+γR−φ(γD+γR)(γSgSR+1)+γRγSgSR
γDφ(γD+γR)−γD(γD+γR+γRγSgSR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2,2
)
,
(29)
with ϕ1=
√−2φ (2γ2D+γDγR+γ2R)+φ2(2γD+γR)2+(γD−γR)2+
γD(2φ− 1) + γR(φ− 1), regarding that gSR and gRD are
exponentially distributed random variables, the probabilities
T1 and T2=Pr (T2,1, T2,2) can be obtained as
T1 =
∫ (γR + γD) (φ− 1)
γSγR
0
FgRD
(
γS
γR + γD
gSR
)
fgSR (x) dx
=−
ΩRD(η2 + η3)
(
exp
(
− (φ−1)(η1ΩSR+ΩRD(η2+η3))γP η1η2ΩRDΩSR
)
− 1
)
η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3)
(30)
T2 =
∫ ψ5
ψ4
FgRD
(
γD + γR − φ(γD + γR)(γSgSR + 1) + γRγSgSR
γDφ(γD + γR)− γD(γD + γR + γRγSgSR)
)
× fgSR (x) dx−
∫ ψ5
ψ4
FgRD
(
γSgSR
γD + γR
)
fgSR (x) dx
=
∫ ψ5
ψ4
FgRD
(
γD+γR−φ(γD+γR)(γSgSR+1)+γRγSgSR
γDφ(γD+γR)−γD(γD+γR+γRγSgSR)
)
fgSR(x)dx
+
ΩRD(η2+η3)
η1ΩSR+ΩRD(η2+η3)
(
− exp
[
−ψ5(η1ΩSR+ΩRD(η2+η3))
ΩRD(η2+η3)
]
+exp
[
− (φ− 1)(η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3))
γP η1η2ΩRDΩSR
])
− e−ψ4 + e−ψ5 .
(31)
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Fig. 12. Regions for integral in (31), for γP = 15 dB, φ = 2, and EPA.
A closed-form approximation for the integral in (31),
which is accurate from medium-to-high SNR regime, can
be obtained by approximating the corresponding integral
region Reg1 (almost null at high SNR), which is formed
by considering the events T2,1 and T
r
2,2 = gRD <
γD+γR−φ(γD+γR)(γSgSR+1)+γRγSgSR
γDφ(γD+γR)−γD(γD+γR+γRγSgSR)
, by an approximate re-
gion Reg2, as depicted in Fig. 12, which considers the event
T ap2,2 = gRD <
ϕ1
2γDγR
instead of the event T r2,2. Then, T2
in (31) can be approximated by
T2 ≈ T˜2 =
(
e−ψ5 − e−ψ4) e− η1ΩSRψ5ΩRD(η2+η3) + ΩRD(η2 + η3)
η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3)
×
(
exp
[
− (φ− 1)(η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3))
γP η1η2ΩRDΩSR
]
− exp
[
−ψ5(η1ΩSR +ΩRD(η2 + η3))
ΩRD(η2 + η3)
])
. (32)
By following the same reasoning, J2 can be also splitted
into two probability terms as
J2 =Pr
(
gSR < ϕ2, gRD <
γSgSR
γR + γD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+Pr
(
gSR > ϕ2, gRD < ϕ3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
,
(33)
with
ϕ2 =
φ
(
2γ2D + 3γDγR + γ
2
R
)− (γD + γR)2
2γDγRγS
+
1
2
√
φ2
(
2γ2D+3γDγR+γ
2
R
)2−2φ(2γ2D+γDγR+γ2R)(γD+γR)2+(γ2D−γ2R)2
γ2Dγ
2
Rγ
2
S
,
(34)
ϕ3 =
γDφ− γD − γR
2γDγR
+
1
2
√
γ2Dφ
2 + (γD − γR)2 − 2γDφ(γD − γR − 2γRγSx)
γ2Dγ
2
R
(35)
where T3 and T4 can be obtained as
T3 =
∫ ϕ2
0
FgRD
(
γS
γR + γD
gSR
)
fgSR (x) dx
=
ΩRD(η2 + η3)
(
exp
[
− η1ψ5ΩSR+η2ψ5ΩRD+η3ψ5ΩRDη2ΩRDΩSR+η3ΩRDΩSR
]
− 1
)
η1ΩSR + η2ΩRD + η3ΩRD
− e−
ψ5
ΩSR + 1, (36)
T4 =
∫ ∞
ϕ2
FgRD (ϕ3) fgSR (x) dx
=
√
piη1φΩSR exp (ψ6)
2ΩRD
√
γP η1η2η3φΩSR
erfc
(
η1φΩSR +ΩRD
√
ϕ4
2ΩRD
√
γP η1η2η3φΩSR
)
+ e
−
ϕ2
ΩSR
(
1− exp
(
η2 − η3φ+ η3 −√ϕ4
2γP η2η3ΩRD
))
, (37)
where T4 can be solved by using [28, Eq. (3.322-1)], ϕ4 =
η22+η
2
3(φ−1)2+2η2η3(2γP η1ϕ2φ+φ−1) and ψ6 is defined
in 11. Finally, by adding the terms J1 ≈ T1 + T˜2 and J2 =
T3+T4 and making some simplifications, (11) can be obtained.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From (9), the average fractional equivocation can be formu-
lated as
∆¯ =E{∆}
≈
∫ ∞
22RS
fΦ (φ) dφ+
∫ 22RS
1
1
2RS
log2 φfΦ (φ) dφ
(b)
=1− FΦ
(
22RS
)
+
1
ln(2)2RS
[
ln(φ)FΦ (Φ)
∣∣∣∣2
2RS
1
−
∫ 22RS
1
1
φ
FΦ (φ) dφ
]
, (38)
where (b) is obtained by applying integration by parts, i.e.∫ b
a
u(t)v′(t)dt = u(b)v(b) − u(a)v(a) − ∫ b
a
u′(t)v(t)dt with
u = ln(φ) and dv = fΦ(φ). Then, after the corresponding
substitutions and some simplifications, we arrive to (13).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The throughput of confidential transmission can be defined
in terms of the probability of successful transmission and the
target secrecy rate, and it can be expressed as
T =PSTRS
=Pr
(
ΓL ≥ 22RT − 1 ∆= τ2
)
RS
(b)≈ Pr
(
γR
γR + γD
min{γSgSR, (γR + γD) gRD} ≥ τ2
)
RS
=Pr
(
gSR ≥ τ2 (γR + γD)
γRγS
, gRD ≥ τ2
γR
)
RS
=RS
[
1− FgSR
(
τ2 (γR + γD)
γRγS
)][
1− FgRD
(
τ2
γR
)]
,
(39)
where (b) was obtained by considering the approximation
in (27). Then, by considering that gSR and gRD are expo-
nentially distributed random variables and after some simpli-
fications, T is obtained as in (19).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The maximum achievable throughput of the confidential
transmission can be obtained by solving the following opti-
mization problem
max
w.r.t. RS ,RT ,η1,η2,η3
T
s.t. RT ≥RS > 0, η1>0, η2>0, η3>0, η1 + η2 + η3=1.
(40)
From (19), it can be noticed that T is a monotonically
decreasing function over RT , in its valid interval, thus we
can consider that the value of RT that maximizes T is given
by the minimum permitted value, i.e., RT = RS . Moreover,
η1 in (19) can be expressed as η1 = 1 − η2 − η3, and,T is
concave w.r.t. η2, while it is monotonically decreasing w.r.t.
η3. Therefore, the optimization problem in (40) can be re-
expressed as
max
w.r.t. RS ,η2
T ′ = T |RT=RS ,η1=1−η2−η3
s.t. RS > 0, η2 > 0, η3 > 0, η2 + η3 < 1. (41)
Hence, the optimal values for R∗S and η
∗
2 that maximize the
throughput are obtained by solving the following equations
∂T ′
∂RS
=
exp
(
(22RS−1)((η2+η3)(ΩRD−ΩSR)+ΩSR)
γP η2ΩRDΩSR(η2+η3−1)
)
γP η2ΩRDΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1)
× [γP η2ΩRDΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1) + 22RS+1RS ln(2)
× ((η2 + η3)(ΩRD − ΩSR) + ΩSR)] = 0
22RS+1RS =
γP η2ΩRDΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1)
ln(2)((η2 + η3)(ΩRD − ΩSR) + ΩSR) , (42)
∂T ′
∂η2
=−
exp
(
(22RS−1)((η2+η3)(ΩRD−ΩSR)+ΩSR)
γP η2ΩRDΩSR(η2+η3−1)
)
γP η22ΩRDΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1)2
× (22RS − 1)RS [ΩRD ((η2 + η3)2 − η3)
−ΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1)2
]
= 0
0 =ΩRD
(
(η2 + η3)
2 − η3
)
ΩSR(η2 + η3 − 1)2
0 =η22(ΩRD − ΩSR) + 2η2(η3(ΩRD − ΩSR) + ΩSR)
+ (η3 − 1)(η3(ΩRD − ΩSR) + ΩSR). (43)
Thus, after solving these equations and some simplifications,
the expressions for R∗S and η
∗
2 in (21) and (22) are obtained,
which are the solutions that satisfy the constraints in (41).
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